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and compassion, much less our pity—both those to whom reciprocity is owed as a matter of basic justice” (JF, 139). 4.10 The Original Position and Political Constructivism Rawls describes the original position as a useful device for reaching greater reflective equilibrium. He holds that the value of the original position as a method of reasoning is affirmed when it selects the first principle of justice, since the first principle accords with many people’s settled convictions about the importance of assuring the basic rights and liberties for all. Having gained credibility by confirming these settled moral judgments, the original position then goes on to select principles for issues on which people’s judgments may be less certain, such as how society should structure employment opportunities, and what a just distribution of wealth and income might be. In this way, the original position first confirms and then extends common judgments about justice. For Rawls it is important that the same method of reasoning that explains the equal basic liberties also justifies more political and economic equality than many people might have initially expected. The momentum of the argument for the first principle carries through to the argument for the second principle. Those who believe in equal basic liberties, but who reject the other egalitarian features of justice as fairness, must try to find some other route to justifying those basic liberties. The original position is also the crux of Rawls’s metaethical theory, political constructivism. Political constructivism is Rawls’s account of the objectivity and validity of political judgments. The original position embodies, Rawls says, all of the relevant conceptions of person and society, and principles of practical reasoning, for making judgments about justice. When there is an overlapping consensus focused on justice as fairness, the original position specifies a shared public perspective from which all citizens can reason about the principles of justice and their application to their society’s institutions. Judgments made from this perspective are then objectively correct, in the sense of giving reasons to citizens to act regardless of their actual motivations, or the reasons they think they have within their particular points of view. Political constructivism does not maintain that the original position shows that the principles of justice as fairness are true. Questions of truth are ones about which reasonable citizens may disagree, and are to be addressed by each citizen from within her own comprehensive doctrine. Judgments made from the original position are, however, valid, or as Rawls says, reasonable. 5. The Law of Peoples: Liberal Foreign Policy With the theories of legitimacy and justice for a self-contained liberal society completed, Rawls then extends his approach to international relations with the next in his sequence of theories: the law of peoples. Rawls assumes that no tolerable world state could be stable. He cites Kant in asserting that a world government would either be a global despotism or beleaguered by groups fighting to gain their political independence. So the law of peoples will be international, not cosmopolitan: it will be a foreign policy that guides a liberal society in its interactions with other societies, both liberal and non-liberal. Rawls describes the main ideas motivating his law of peoples as follows: Two main ideas motivate the Law of Peoples. One is that the great evils of human history—unjust war and oppression, religious persecution and the denial of liberty of conscience, starvation and poverty, not to mention genocide and mass murder—follow from political injustice, with its own cruelties and callousness... The other main idea, obviously connected with the first, is that, once the gravest forms of political injustice are eliminated by following just (or at least decent) social policies and establishing just (or at least decent) basic institutions, these great evils will eventually disappear (LP, 6–7). The most important feature of the “realistic utopia” that Rawls envisages in The Law of Peoples is that the great evils of human history no longer occur. The most important condition for this realistic utopia to come about is that all societies are internally well-ordered: that all have just, or at least decent, domestic political institutions. 5.1 The International Basic Structure and the Principles of the Law of Peoples Much of Rawls’s presentation of the law of peoples parallels the presentations of political liberalism and justice as fairness. As a liberal society has a basic structure of institutions so, Rawls says, there is an international basic structure (LP, 33, 62, 114, 115, 122, 123). While Rawls does not say that the international basic structure has a pervasive impact on the life chances of individuals, the rules of this basic structure are coercively enforced (for example, Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was coercively reversed by a coalition of other countries). The principles that should regulate this international basic structure thus require justification. The justification of these principles must accommodate the fact that there is even more pluralism in worldviews among contemporary societies than there is within a single liberal society. Rawls puts forward eight principles for ordering the international basic structure: Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence are to be respected by other peoples. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them. Peoples are to observe the duty of nonintervention (except to address grave violations of human rights). Peoples have a right of self-defense, but no right to instigate war for reasons other than self-defense. Peoples are to honor human rights. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of war. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social regime (LP, 37). All of these principles, with the exception of the last one, are familiar from contemporary international law (though Rawls’s list of human rights for principles 4 and 6 is shorter than the list in international law). Rawls also leaves room for his law of peoples to accommodate various organizations that may help societies to increase their political and economic coordination, such as idealized versions of a United Nations, a World Trade Organization, and a World Bank. 5.2 Peoples: Liberal and Decent The actors in Rawls’s international theory are not individuals (citizens) but societies (peoples). A people is a group of individuals ruled by a common government, bound together by common sympathies, and firmly attached to a common conception of right and justice. “People” is a moralized concept, and not all states currently on the world map qualify as such. Rawls’s conception of peoples within the law of peoples parallels his conception of citizens within justice as fairness. Peoples see themselves as free in the sense of being rightfully politically independent; and as equal in regarding themselves as equally deserving of recognition and respect. Peoples are reasonable in that they will honor fair terms of cooperation with other peoples, even at cost to their own interests, given that other peoples will also honor those terms. Reasonable peoples are thus unwilling to try to impose their political or social ideals on other reasonable peoples. They satisfy the criterion of reciprocity with respect to one another. Rawls describes the fundamental interests of a people as follows: Protecting its political independence, its territory, and the security of its citizens; Maintaining its political and social institutions and its civic culture; Securing its proper self-respect as a people, which rests on its citizens’ awareness of its history and cultural accomplishments. Rawls contrasts peoples with states. A state, Rawls says, is moved by the desires to enlarge its territory, or to convert other societies to its religion, or to enjoy the power of ruling over others, or to increase its relative economic strength. Peoples are not states, and as we will see peoples may treat societies that act like states as international outlaws. Peoples are of two types, depending on the nature of their domestic political institutions. Liberal peoples satisfy the requirements of political liberalism: they have legitimate liberal constitutions, and they have governments that are under popular control and not driven by large concentration of private economic power. Decent peoples are not internally just from a liberal perspective. Their basic institutions do not recognize reasonable pluralism or embody any interpretation of the liberal ideas of free and equal citizens cooperating fairly. The institutions of a decent society may be organized around a single comprehensive doctrine, such as a dominant religion. The political system may not be democratic, and women or members of minority religions may be excluded from public office. Nevertheless, decent peoples are well-ordered enough, Rawls says, to merit equal membership in international society. Like all peoples, decent peoples do not have aggressive foreign policies. Beyond this, Rawls describes one type of decent society—a decent hierarchical society—to illustrate what decency requires. A decent hierarchical society’s basic structure specifies a decent system of social cooperation. First, it secures a core list of human rights. Second, its political system takes the fundamental interests of all persons into account through a decent consultation hierarchy. This means that the government genuinely consults with the representatives of all social groups, which together represent all persons in the society, and that the government justifies its laws and policies to these groups. The government does not close down protests, and responds to any protests with conscientious replies. The government also supports the right of citizens to emigrate. Rawls imagines a decent hierarchical society that he calls “Kazakhstan.” In Kazakhstan, Islam is the favored religion, and only Muslims can hold the high office. However non-Muslim religions may be practiced without fear, and believers in them are encouraged to take part in the civic culture of the wider society. Minorities are not subject to arbitrary discrimination by law, or treated as inferior by Muslims. Kazakhstan would qualify, Rawls says, as a decent, well-ordered member of the society of peoples, entitled to respectful toleration and equal treatment by other peoples. 5.3 International Toleration and Human Rights Liberal peoples tolerate decent peoples, and indeed treat them as equals. Not to do so, Rawls says, would be to fail to express sufficient respect for acceptable ways of ordering a society. Liberal peoples should recognize the good of national self-determination, and let decent societies decide their futures for themselves. The government of a liberal people should not criticize decent peoples for failing to be liberal, or set up incentives for them to become more so. Criticism and inducements may cause bitterness and resentment within decent peoples, and so be counter-productive. Indeed public reason imposes duties of civility upon the members of international society, just as it does upon members of a liberal society. Government officials and candidates for high office should explain their foreign policy positions to other peoples in terms of the principles and values of the law of peoples, and should avoid reliance on contentious parochial reasons that all peoples cannot reasonably share. One major reason that liberal peoples tolerate decent peoples, Rawls says, is that decent peoples secure for all persons within their territory a core list of human rights. These core human rights include rights to subsistence, security, personal property, and formal equality before the law, as well as freedoms from slavery, protections of ethnic groups against genocide, and some measure of liberty of conscience (but not, as we have seen, a right to democratic participation). These core human rights are the minimal conditions required for persons to be able to engage in social cooperation in any real sense, so any well-ordered society must protect them. The role of human rights in the law of peoples is thus to set limits on international toleration. Any society that guarantees Rawls’s list of human rights is to be immune from coercive intervention from other peoples. Societies that violate human rights overstep the limits of toleration, and may rightly be subject to economic sanctions or even military intervention. 5.4 The International Original Position The international original position parallels the domestic original position of justice as fairness. This original position answers the question: “What terms of cooperation would free and equal peoples (liberal and decent) agree to under fair conditions?” The strategy is to build the conception of peoples into the design of this original position, along with restrictions on reasons for favoring basic principles of international law. The strategy, that is, is to describe reasonable conditions under which a rational agreement on principles can be made. In the international original position, representatives of each people agree on principles for the international basic structure. Each party is behind a veil of ignorance, deprived of information about the people they represent, such as the size of its territory and population, and its relative political and economic strength. Each party tries to do the best they can for the people they represent, in terms of the fundamental interests that all peoples have. Rawls claims that the parties in the international original position would favor the eight principles listed above. Starting from a baseline of equality and independence, the parties would see no reason to introduce inequalities into the relationships among peoples (beyond certain functional inequalities in the design of cooperative organizations, such as richer countries contributing more to an idealized United Nations). The parties would reject international utilitarian principles, as no people is prepared to accept that it should sacrifice its fundamental interests for the sake of greater total global utility. After selecting the eight principles of the law of peoples, the parties next check that these principles can stably order international relations over time. Analogously to the domestic case, the parties will see that the principles of the law of peoples affirm the good of peoples, and that peoples will develop trust and confidence in one another as all willingly continue to abide by these principles. The stability of the international political order will thus be stability for the right reasons (and not a mere *modus vivendi*), since each people will affirm the principles as its first-best option whatever the international balance of power might become. Rawls also attempts to draw empirical support for his stability argument from the literature on the democratic peace. Social scientists have found that historically democracies have tended not to go to war with one another. Rawls explains this by saying that liberal societies are, because of their internal political structures, satisfied. Liberal peoples have no desires for imperial glory, territorial expansion, or to convert others to their religion, or whatever goods and services they need from other countries they can obtain through trade. Liberal peoples, Rawls says, have no reasons to fight aggressive wars, so a genuine peace can endure among them. And since decent peoples are defined as non-aggressive, any decent people can join this liberal peace as well. Once the parties have agreed to the eight principles of the law of peoples, they then continue to specify these principles more precisely in a process analogous to the domestic four-stage sequence. 5.5 Non-Ideal Theory: Outlaw States and Burdened Societies The principles selected in the international original position contain provisions for non-ideal situations: situations in which nations are unwilling to comply with the ideal principles, or are unable to cooperate on their terms. These provisions are embedded in principles 4 through 8 of the law of peoples. Outlaw states are non-compliant: they threaten the peace by attempting to expand their power and influence, or by violating the human rights of those within their territory. The principles of the law of peoples allow peoples to fight these outlaw states in self-defense, and to take coercive actions against them to stop their violations of human rights. In any military confrontations with outlaw states, peoples must obey the principles of the just prosecution of war, such as avoiding direct attacks on enemy civilians in all but the most desperate circumstances. The aim of war, Rawls says, must be to bring all societies to honor the law of peoples, and eventually to become fully participating members of international society. Burdened societies struggle with social and economic conditions that make it difficult for them to maintain either liberal or decent institutions. A burdened society may lack sufficient material or social resources to support a scheme of social cooperation, perhaps because its population has grown beyond its territory’s means to support it. It is the basic structure and political culture of a society that are most crucial for its self-sufficiency; the international community must help a burdened society to rise above this threshold. The law of peoples (eighth principle) requires that burdened peoples be assisted until they can handle their own affairs (i.e., become well-ordered). This duty of assistance is Rawls’s greatest divergence from the rules of today’s international law. Accepting this duty would require significant changes in how nations respond to global poverty and failed states. 5.6 Reconciliation and Realistic Utopia Rawls’s vision is of a perpetually peaceful and cooperative international order, where liberal and decent peoples stand ready to pacify aggressive states, to secure core human rights, and to help struggling countries until they become self-sufficient. Compared to other theories, Rawls’s international theory has limited ambitions. Officials of democratic societies can do little more than hope that decent societies will become internally more tolerant and democratic. Once the duty to assist burdened peoples is satisfied, there are no further requirements on international economic distributions: for Rawls, international economic inequalities are of no political concern as such. Moreover, individuals around the world may suffer greatly from bad luck, and they may be haunted by spiritual emptiness. These are not concerns reached by a Rawlsian foreign policy. The limited practical goal of Rawls’s law of peoples is the elimination of the great evils of human history: unjust war and oppression, religious persecution and the denial of liberty of conscience, starvation and poverty, genocide and mass murder. The limits of this ambition mean that there will be much in the world to which Rawls’s political philosophy offers no reconciliation. Nevertheless, while Rawls’s vision is limited, it is also utopian. To believe that Rawls’s vision is possible is to believe that individuals are not inevitably selfish or amoral, and that international relations can be more than merely a contest for domination, wealth, and glory. Human life, and human history, need not be merely a Hobbesian “perpetual and restless desire of power after power” (1651, 58). Affirming the possibility of a just and peaceful future can inoculate us against a cynicism that undermines the decency, reciprocity, and reasonableness that exist now and that may grow from now on. “By showing how the social world may realize the features of a realistic utopia,” Rawls says, “political philosophy provides a long-term goal of political endeavor, and in working toward it gives meaning to what we can do today” (LP, 128). 6. Further Reading Beyond the texts by Rawls cited above, readers may wish to consult Rawls’s lectures on Hume, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel (LHMP) and on Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Mill, Marx, Sidgwick, and Butler (LHPP) to see how Rawls’s interpretations of these authors informed his own theorizing. Reath, Herman, and Korsgaard (1997) is a collection of essays by Rawls’s students on his work in the history of philosophy. The scholarly literature on Rawls is vast; below are some entry points that may be useful. Voice (2011) is a summary and defense of Rawls’s three main books that is accessible to those with some undergraduate philosophical training. More advanced students wanting a guide to A Theory of Justice may wish to read Mandle (2009). Mandle and Reidy (2014) is a lexicon with short entries on important concepts, issues, influences, and critics, from Abortion to Maximin to Wittgenstein. Freeman (2007) sets out in a single volume the historical development of Rawls’s theories, as well as sympathetic elaborations of many of his central arguments. Weithman (2011) details the evolution of Rawls’s thought from A Theory of Justice to Political Liberalism. Pogge (2007) is an explication of Rawls’s domestic theories, which also contains a biographical sketch and brief replies to libertarian and communitarian critics (for which see also Pogge (1989)). Maffettone (2011) and Audard (2007) are critical introductions to Rawls’s three major works. Historically, the most influential volume of essays on justice as fairness has been Daniels (1975). Freeman (2003) is a collection of articles on major themes in Rawls’s domestic theories; it also contains an introductory overview of all of Rawls’s work. Brooks and Nussbaum (2015) collects articles on Rawls’s political liberalism. Older collections on political liberalism include Davion and Wolf (1999), Griffin and Solum (1994) and Lloyd (1994). Martin and Reidy (2006) focuses on the law of peoples. Hinton (2015) is a collection on the original position. Mandle and Reidy (2013) and Reidy (2008) are volumes of scholarly essays spanning a wide range of issues arising from Rawls’s work. Young (2016) is a selection of more critical articles. Mandle and Roberts-Cady (2020) pairs authors in debates over major issues in Rawls’s writings. A debate over Rawls and race is between Mills (2017, chs. 8 and 9) and Shelby (2004, 2013). Abbey (2013) is a volume on feminist engagements with Rawls’s work. Bailey and Gentile (2014) is an anthology that explore how extensively religious believers can engage in the political life of a Rawlsian society. Brooks (2012) and Fleming (2004) are collections on Rawls and the law. O’Neill and Williamson (2012) is on the institutional design of a Rawlsian property-owning democracy. Edmundson (2017) argues that Rawlsian justice requires socialism. Galisanka (2019) is an intellectual history leading up to A Theory of Justice, that also details Rawls’s experiences in World War II. Gregory (2007) and Nelson (2019, ch. 3) examine Rawls’s early religious writings. Bok (2017) emphasizes the Wittgensteinian influences on Rawls’s early thought. Botti (2019) situates Rawls within American pragmatism. Recent historicist treatments of Rawls’s work include Forrester (2019) and some of the essays in Smith, Bejan, and Zimmerman (2021). In this last volume, Terry (2021) discusses Rawls’s condemnation of the racism of the Vietnam draft. Readers who can gain access (usually through a library) to Kukathas (2003, 4 volumes) or Richardson and Weithman (1999, 5 volumes) will find many of older scholarly articles on Rawls’s work, divided according to specific themes (e.g., maximin reasoning, public reason) and types of criticisms (e.g., conservative critiques, feminist critiques). Readers without access to the Richardson and Weithman volumes can follow the links, in the Other Internet Resources section below, to their tables of contents and can then locate the articles in their original places of publication.

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